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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical (Hypothetical One): Harold Smith has just
committed a homicide. Harold's boss discovered that Harold had been embezzling
the company's money for the past two years. When Harold's boss confronted him,
Harold became violent and shot his boss with the handgun Harold kept in his desk
drawer. Harold is now on the run. He purchased an airline ticket to Mexico City,
Mexico. Once he arrived in Mexico City, he wrote a letter to his wife explaining
what had happened. Harold mailed the letter to his wife with no return address.
Wendy, Harold's wife, received the letter three days after learning that Harold was
wanted for murder. When police officers arrived at Wendy's home to question her,
she admitted that she had received a letter from her husband. However, Wendy
refused to disclose the contents of the letter because her attorney advised her that
the marital communications privilege would protect any communications between
Harold and Wendy. Despite the police officers' best efforts, they were unable to
learn the contents of the letter.
Now, consider the following hypothetical (Hypothetical Two): The facts are
identical to those of Hypothetical One with one significant change. Rather than
writing Wendy a letter, Harold visited an internet caf6 in Mexico City and sent
Wendy an e-mail from his Hotmail account to her Hotmail account. During the
police officers' questioning of Wendy, she admitted that she received an e-mail
from Harold, but she refused to disclose the contents of the e-mail. Not to be
deterred, the police officers contacted the assistant district attorney on the case and
explained the situation. The assistant district attorney prepared a subpoena directed
to Microsoft, the operator of Hotmail.' The.subpoena demanded production of any
e-mails sent between Harold's account and Wendy's account during the week
following the homicide. Microsoft complied with the subpoena and produced the
e-mails, which are stored on a server owned by Microsoft.
Most would agree that the marital communications privilege protects the
communication between Harold and Wendy described in Hypothetical One.
However, the change in the form of communication described in Hypothetical Two
could affect application of the privilege. This Article takes a fresh and innovative
look at whether the marital communication privilege should protect
communications between husband and wife sent via electronic means.
Traditionally, the marital communications privilege is destroyed when a third
party, without the knowledge or involvement of the recipient-spouse,2 intentionally
or inadvertently discovers the communication.3 In the context of electronic
communication, 4 where Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have access to otherwise

1. See Microsoft Online Services Home, http://join.msn.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
2. For purposes of this Article, "recipient-spouse" refers to the spouse who receives the
communication from the "communicating spouse."
3. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
4. "Electronic communication" is limited, for purposes of this article, to electronic mail. Other
forms of electronic communication, including text messages, instant messages, and cellular phone
conversations, are outside the purview of this article.
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confidential communications, the marital communications privilege may not apply
at all.' Indeed, it is possible to argue that the marital communications privilege is
inherently at odds with this form of communication.
This Article has two purposes. First, it explores whether the marital
communications privilege currently protects e-mail communication and whether the
privilege should protect such communication. Second, it addresses whether the
marital communications privilege should continue to exist, considering the
traditional purposes of the privilege. Part I1 of the Article discusses the history of
the marital communications privilege. Part III explores the details of e-mail storage
and addresses constitutional and statutory provisions outside the context of the
marital communications privilege that provide some privacy protection for
electronic communications. Part IV takes a critical look at whether the marital
communications privilege applies to electronic communication based on more
traditional applications of the privilege and highlights three legislative solutions
that have been put in place to protect privileged communications made
electronically. Part V discusses whether courts should reconsider the marital
communications privilege as a whole considering the stated purposes of the
privilege. Part VI provides a conclusion.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE

The marital privilege has two parts: the testimonial privilege and the
communications privilege. Originally, the testimonial privilege prevented one
spouse from testifying against another. According to the United States Supreme
Court, spousal disqualification sprang from two canons of medieval jurisprudence:
First, the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in his
own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the
concept that husband and wife were one, and that since the
woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband
was that one.6
Thus, if a husband were not permitted to testify, then his wife, as a part of the
husband, likewise should not be permitted to testify.7

5. See infra Part Ill.
6. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); see also John T. Hundley, "Inadvertent
Waiver" ofEvidentiary Privileges: Can Reformulatingthe Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19
S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 265 n.9 (comparing the application of the original testimonial privilege to cases
holding the testimony of slaves inadmissible against their masters).
7. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; see also People v. Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d 43, 55 (Mich. 1989)
(Boyle, J., dissenting) ("The marital privileges can be traced to the period of our history when a woman,
possessing no legal identity of her own, was treated as the chattel of her husband.").
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In 1933, the United States Supreme Court abolished the rule disqualifying
spouses from testifying in federal court on each other's behalf;8 however, a
privilege remained that prevented either spouse from providing adverse testimony
against the other.9 The rationale for the testimonial privilege is its role in protecting
marital harmony and the sanctity of the marital relationship.'o In Hawkins v. United
States, the Court held that the testimonial privilege prevented one spouse from
testifying adversely against the other regardless of whether the testimony was
voluntary or compelled by the government."1 Over twenty years later in Trammel
v. United States, the Court held that the testimonial privilege, as applied in the
federal courts, should vest in the witness-spouse alone, thereby allowing the
witness-spouse to voluntarily provide adverse testimony against the defendantspouse. 2
The Supreme Court expressly recognized the communications privilege in
1934. 3 In Wolfie v. UnitedStates, the Court noted that the purpose of the privilege
is to protect "marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the
marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of
justice which the privilege entails.' 4 The purpose of the marital communications
privilege is very similar to the purposes of the other evidentiary privileges
recognized by the courts, including the privileges between attorney and client,
physician and patient, psychotherapist and patient, and clergy and communicant,

8. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 386-87 (1933). In Funk, the Court noted a major change
in the common law in that defendants are no longer disqualified from testifying on their own behalf.
Id.at 381. Thus, "a refusal to permit the wife upon the ground of interest to testify in behalf of her
husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to testify for himself, presents a manifest
incongruity." Id.According to the Court in Funk, any risk of bias or interest on the part of the witnessspouse could be reduced through the use of cross-examination, thus making the issue of bias an issue
of credibility rather than competency to testify. Id.at 380.
9. Id. at 373; see also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 76 (1958) (citing Funk, 290 U.S.
at 373; Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 714-15 (1949)) ("The Funk case ...did not criticize the
phase of the common-law rule which allowed either spouse to exclude adverse testimony by the other,
but left this question open to further scrutiny.").
10. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44. As the Court noted in Hawkins, "[t]he basic reason the law has
refused to pit wife against husband or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was
a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife
and children, but for the benefit of the public as well." 358 U.S. at 77.
11. 358 U.S. at 77-79. The Hawkins Court found that "the law should not force or encourage
testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences."
Id. at 79.
12. 445 U.S. at 53. The Court reasoned that when one spouse is willing to provide adverse
testimony against the other spouse, "their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably
little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." Id. at 52.
13. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
14. Id.; see also Anne N. DePrez, Note, Pillow Talk, Grimgribbersand Connubial Bliss: The
MaritalCommunication Privilege, 56 IND. L.J. 121, 127 (1980) (stating that a second rationale for the
communications privilege "is that society finds it naturally repugnant to observe a wife being forced
to reveal her husband's marital confidences on the witness stand").
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in that each of these privileges is "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and
trust."' 5
Thus, communications between spouses are presumptively confidential, and
any party seeking to introduce such communications into evidence must overcome
the presumption by establishing facts which show a lack of confidentiality.' 6 One
way to overcome the presumption is to show that the communication was made in
the presence of a third party.' 7 In Wolfie, the government sought to introduce into
evidence a letter written by the petitioner to his wife.'" Although the privilege
would normally protect this type of communication, the government argued that the
petitioner's utilization of his personal stenographer to write the letter prevented the
marital communications privilege from attaching. 9 The government sought to
introduce the contents of the letter not through the testimony of the wife, but
through that of the stenographer, who had kept her notes.2 ° The government argued
that communications between spouses are not privileged if proof of the content of
the communications can be made by a witness who is neither the husband nor the
wife. 2' The Court agreed, holding that the privilege did not prevent disclosure of the
contents of the letter.22 According to the Court, disclosure to the stenographer was
voluntary and unnecessary.23 Thus, the petitioner's decision to reveal the
communication to a third party destroyed any privilege that would have otherwise
attached to the communication.24
This rule (the third party presence rule) is in accord with the courts' desire to
construe the privilege narrowly due to the privilege's role in "obstruct[ing] the

15. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51.
The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual
counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts
or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return. The
lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know
all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional
mission is to be carried out. Similarly, the physician must know all that a patient
can articulate in order to identify and to treat disease; barriers to full disclosure
would impair diagnosis and treatment.
Id.
16. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) ("Although marital communications are
presumed to be confidential, that presumption may be overcome by proof of facts showing that they
were not intended to be private."); see also Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951) (stating that
courts presume that marital communications are privileged); Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (assuming that
marital communications are meant to be confidential and are therefore privileged).
17. Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 12-13.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id. at 16-17.
24. Id. at 17. In support of its holding, the Court cited cases finding that communications between
spouses voluntarily made in the presence of their children or other family members are not privileged.
Id. (citing Linnell v. Linnell, 143 N.E. 813, 814 (Mass. 1924); Cowser v. State, 157 S.W. 758, 760 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1913); Fuller v. Fuller, 130 S.E. 270, 271 (W.Va. 1925)).
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truth-seeking process. '25 Additionally, while the purpose of the communications
privilege is the preservation of marital confidences, courts reason that this purpose
is not thwarted if a third party brings the communication into evidence.26
Importantly, there is only one circumstance where the privilege will attach despite
disclosure to a third party outside the marriage. Attachment of the privilege will
occur when the recipient-spouse voluntarilydiscloses the communication to a third
party. 27 Where the recipient-spouse colludes with a third party to betray the trust of
the communicating spouse, courts seek to protect the trust upon which the
communicating spouse relied when confiding in the recipient-spouse. 8
Many commentators have criticized the communications privilege,29 with some
authors arguing that courts should abandon the privilege entirely.3" Opponents of
the privilege argue that it blocks the truth-seeking process while failing to
adequately promote marital harmony.3 Others have argued that the
communications privilege "perpetuate[s] the role of male domination in the
marriage" because a husband usually invokes the privilege to prevent his wife's
disclosure of confidential communications, thereby benefiting men more often than
women.3 2 Finally, opponents of the privilege have argued that the privilege is
unnecessary considering the fact that most married couples are unaware of its
existence.33 The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence
apparently agreed with this criticism of the communications privilege. The
Committee drafted proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, which addressed the
testimonial privilege but failed to mention the communications privilege.34 In the

25. United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1990).
26. See State v. Myers, 640 P.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Kan. 1982) (finding the third party presence rule
assists in the discovery of the truth while protecting confidential communications between husband and
wife).
27. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2339(2) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
28. See Yokie v. State, 773 So. 2d 115, 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). In Yokie, the defendant's
wife allowed police officers to come into her home and listen in on her telephone conversations with
her husband. Id. at 116. The court held that the communications privilege would attach to the phone
conversations even though a third party was present because the defendant's wife had, "with the state's
encouragement, betrayed the trust that the privilege is designed to protect by deliberately misleading
[the defendant] into feeling safe in making the otherwise privileged disclosures." Id. at 117.
29. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 86 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (noting that
some commentators have criticized both marital privileges, especially in the absence of empirical
support).
30. See generally DePrez, supra note 14, at 137-38 (noting that operation of the marital
communications privilege often excludes vital evidence). DePrez further argues that the marital
communications privilege, in its current form, should be abandoned and replaced with a privilege that
protects confidential communications between spouses only to the extent such communications are
protected by the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 149.
31. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 29, § 86 ("[W]hile the danger of injustice from
suppression of relevant proof is clear and certain, the probable benefits of the rule of privilege in
encouraging marital confidences and wedded harmony is at best doubtful and marginal.").
32. People v. Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d 43, 56 n.5 (Mich. 1989) (Boyle, J., dissenting).
33. DePrez, supranote 14, at 136.
34. See Rules of Evidencefor United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 244 (1972)
(Proposed Rule 505).
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Advisory Committee's Notes following the proposed Rule, the Committee stated
that Rule 505 did not recognize the communications privilege because a privilege
"of whose existence the parties in all likelihood are unaware" may have little
influence on marital conduct.35 The Committee reasoned that, unlike the other
evidentiary privileges, there is no professional party in the marital relationship who
can advise the communicating party of the existence of the privilege.3 6 Congress
rejected proposed Rule 505, along with eight other proposed rules that would have
codified various evidentiary privileges, 37 and enacted Rule 50 1,38 which was
courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on
intended to "provide the
39
a case-by-case basis.
Despite criticism of the rule, the marital communications privilege is quite
prevalent. The privilege is codified in forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia.4" At the federal level, although the marital communications privilege is
not codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the privilege is a part of federal

35. Id.at 246.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 234-35 (proposing Rule 502 for the required reports privilege); id.at 235-37
(proposing Rule 503 for the attorney-client privilege); id.at 240-41 (proposing Rule 504 for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege); id. at 244-45 (proposing Rule 505 for the spousal testimonial
privilege); id at 247 (proposing Rule 506 for the clergy-communicant privilege); id at 249 (proposing
Rule 507 for the political vote privilege); id. at 249-50 (proposing Rule 508 for the trade secrets
privilege); id.at 251-52 (proposing Rule 509 for the secrets of state privilege); id at 255-56 (proposing
Rule 510 for the identity of informant privilege).
38. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933-34 (1975).
39. 120 CONG. REC. 40,890, at 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate).
40. See ALA. R. EVID. 504(b); ALASKA R. EVID. 505(b); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2232 (2003);
ARK. R. EVID. 504(b); CAL. EvID. CODE § 917(a) (West Supp. 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90107(l)(a)(l) (Supp. 2006); DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 504(b); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306 (LexisNexis Supp.
2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 (West 1999); GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-9-21(1) (1995); HAW. R. EVID.
505(b); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(1) (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-801 (West 2003); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(4) (LexisNexis 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.9 (West 1999); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-428 (2005); Ky. R. EVID. 504(b); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 504 (2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15 § 1315 (1999); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD.PROC. § 9-105 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 20 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162(7) (West Supp. 2006); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(a) (West 2000); Miss. R. EViD. 504(b); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (West 2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-802 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.295(1 )(b) (LexisNexis 2002); N.H.R. EvID. 504; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22 (West 1994); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 38-6-6(A) (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502(b) (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-57(c) (2005); N.D.R. EVID. 504(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2504 (West Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255 (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5914 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-13 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Supp. 2004);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-13 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201 (2000); TEX. R. EvID. 504(a)(2);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(1) (2002); VT. R. EvID. 504(b); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Supp.
2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-4
(LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West 2000); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 1-12-104 (2005).
Connecticut has not codified the marital communications privilege; however, its courts recognize the
privilege and have found that it is a "fixture of [Connecticut] common law." State v. Christian, 841 A.2d
1158, 1173 (Conn. 2004).
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common law. 4 ' Additionally, courts in forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have held that the presence of a third party
destroys any privilege that
42
might attach to a communication between spouses.

41. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that the law on evidentiary privileges "shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience"); see, e.g., SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The federal
common law recognizes two types of marital privileges: the privilege against adverse spousal testimony
and the confidential marital communications privilege."); United States v. Hook, 781 F.2d 1166, 1173
n. 11 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that the federal common law recognizes a privilege for confidential
communications between spouses).
42. See State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686, 694-95 (Ariz. 1984) (quoting State v. Narten, 407 P.2d
81, 87 (Ariz. 1965)); Metcalf v. State, 681 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Ark. 1984) (citing Sumlin v. State, 617
S.W.2d 372, 376 (Ark. 1981)); People v. Gaines, 375 P.2d 296, 300 (Cal. 1962); Thrap v. People, 558
P.2d 576, 578 (Colo. 1977); Christian,841 A.2d at 1178; Weedon v. State, 647 A.2d 1078, 1081 (Del.
1994); Beard v. United States, 535 A.2d 1373, 1381 (D.C. 1988) (citing Morgan v. United States, 363
A.2d 999, 1004 (D.C. 1976); People v. Torres, 310 N.E.2d 780, 784-85 (I11.App. Ct. 1974)); Proffitt
v. State, 315 So. 2d 461,465 (Fla. 1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Williams v. State, 77 S.E. 818,
818 (Ga. 1913) (citing Knight v. State, 39 S.E. 928, 929 (1901)); State v. Levi, 686 P.2d 9, 11 (Haw.
1984); State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174, 182 (Idaho 1998); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 (Ill.
1983); Holt v. State, 481 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Ind. 1985); State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 561
(Iowa 1997) (citations omitted); State v. Myers, 640 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Kan. 1982); Ewing v. May, 705
S.W.2d 910, 912 (Ky. 1986); State v. Stroud, 5 So. 2d 125, 127-28 (La. 1941); State v. Benner, 284
A.2d 91, 109 (Me. 1971); Master v. Master, 166 A.2d 251,255 (Md. 1960); Martin v. Martin, 166 N.E.
820, 820 (Mass. 1929) (citing Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 120 N.E. 209, 212 (Mass. 1918)); People
v. Rosa, 256 N.W. 483, 485 (Mich. 1934); State v. Schifsky, 69 N.W.2d 89,94 (Minn. 1955); Stevens
v. State, 806 So. 2d 1031, 1049 (Miss. 2001) (citations omitted); State v. Shafer, 609 S.W.2d 153, 155
(Mo. 1980) (citing Allen v. Allen, 60 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933)); State v. Nettleton, 760
P.2d 733, 737 (Mont. 1988) (citing In re Marriage of Sarsfield, 671 P.2d 595, 601 (Mont. 1983)); State
v. Cowling, No. A-92-744, 1993 WL 183609, at *3 (Neb. Ct. App. June 1, 1993); Foss v. State, 547
P.2d 688, 691 (Nev. 1976); State v. Wilkinson, 612 A.2d 926, 931 (N.H. 1992); State v. Szemple, 640
A.2d 817, 822 (N.J. 1994); In re Vanderbilt (Rosner-Hickey), 439 N.E.2d 378, 382-83 (N.Y. 1982);
State v. Freeman, 276 S.E.2d 450, 455 (N.C. 1981); State v. McMorrow, 314 N.W.2d 287, 292 (N.D.
1982); State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401,405 (Ohio 1986); Coles v. Harsch, 276 P. 248,252 (Or. 1929);
Commonwealth v. May, 656 A.2d 1335, 1342 (Pa. 1995) (citing Commonwealth v. Clark, 500 A.2d
440, 442 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)); State v. McKercher, 332 N.W.2d 286, 288 (S.D. 1983); Hazlett v.
Bryant, 241 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tenn. 1951) (citations omitted); State v. Musser, 175 P.2d 724, 737 (Utah
1946), vacatedon othergrounds, 333 U.S. 95, 98 (1948); In re Buckman's Will, 24 A. 252, 252 (Vt.
1892); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E.2d 9, 13 (Va. 1949) (quoting Pilcher v. Pilcher, 84 S.E. 667,
671 (Va. 1915)); State v. Thorne, 260 P.2d 331, 337 (Wash. 1953); State v. Bohon, 565 S.E.2d 399,
404-05 (W. Va. 2002); Kain v. State, 179 N.W.2d 777, 780-81 (Wis. 1970); Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d
272, 275 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 286 (Wyo. 1960)); Arnold v. State,
353 So. 2d 524, 527 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Teel, 712 P.2d 792, 794 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1953)); McHam v. State, 126 P.3d 662,670-71 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2005) (citing Coleman v. State, 668 P.2d 1126, 1134 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983)); Zimmerman
v. State, 750 S.W.2d 194, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (citations omitted). Alaska and South Carolina
courts have not addressed the third party presence rule. But see Campbell v. Chace 12 R.I. 333, 334
(R.I. 1879) (excluding from evidence testimony regarding communications between a husband and wife
made in the presence of other parties and finding that it is not a judge's place to determine the
confidentiality of communications between husband and wife because "[t]o enable the court to judge,
the communication must be disclosed to the court, and so the mischief intended to be guarded against
will be committed in the process of ascertaining whether it is entitled to be guarded against").
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III. WEB-BASED ELECTRONIC MAIL

This Article analyzes the marital communications privilege as it relates to webbased e-mail.43 Web-based e-mail is sent from the writer to the recipient by means
of a third party server." These third parties, ISPs, store and process a user's e-

mails.45 Rather than accessing an e-mail by downloading it onto her personal
computer, a user of web-based e-mail can access the e-mail from any computer via

the World Wide Web.46 The e-mail message sits on the ISP's server for an
undetermined amount of time, sometimes even after the e-mail has been deleted by
the recipient.47

In recent years, web-based e-mail has become increasingly popular. ISPs like
Google, MSN, and Yahoo! have increased the amount of free storage space that
they provide to users of their web-based e-mail systems.48 As one commentator

noted, ISPs will continue to increase storage in order to ensure that customers will
49

use their e-mail services more often and have no reason to delete old e-mails.
Before addressing whether the marital communications privilege prevents law
enforcement from accessing e-mails sent via web-based accounts, it is important to

determine whether other protections exist. Surprisingly, web-based e-mails are not
protected to the extent that one might expect.
A.

Privacy Agreements

Most ISPs enter into privacy agreements with their users." Typically, the
privacy agreements address the extent to which ISPs collect users' personal

information and provide such information to other parties.

1

For example, the

privacy policies provided by Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! all state that the ISPs

43. E-mail downloaded to a user's home or work computer is outside the purview of this article.
44. See James X. Dempsey, DigitalSearch & Seizure: UpdatingPrivacyProtectionsto Keep Pace
with Technology, 865 PLIIPat 505, 517 (2006).
45. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, anda Legislator'sGuide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208, 1210 (2004); see also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J.
406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting that America Online stores its customers' e-mails at a privatelyowned computer bank in Vienna, Virginia).
46. Dempsey, supra note 44, at 517.
47. Id. at 523 ("[S]ince ISPs retain data for varying lengths of time, and do not always delete email
immediately upon request, customers may not be aware of whether their email is still stored and thus
susceptible to disclosure.").
48.Id.at 516-17.
49. Id. at 517-18 (citing Janis Mara, MSNHotmail UpgradesE-Mail,IncreasesStorage, ClickZ,
June 24, 2004, http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3372781).
50. See, e.g., Gmail Privacy Policy (Oct. 14, 2005), http://gmail.google.com/mail/help/privacy
.html (describing Google's privacy practices, including how Google treats its customers' personal
information); Microsoft Online Privacy Statement (Jan. 2006), http://privacy.microsoft.com/enus/fullnotice.aspx (describing Microsoft's customer policies regarding collection, use, sharing, and
accessing personal information); Yahoo! Privacy Policy (Mar. 28, 2002), http://privacy.yahoo.com/
privacy/us/ (describing the extent of Yahoo!'s customer privacy protections).
51. See supra note 50.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 58: 275

will not sell personal information to third parties,
but that the ISPs will provide
52
information in order to comply with the law.
Most ISP privacy policies contain no information regarding the deletion of emails from the ISP server once the e-mail has been deleted from the user's
account;53 however, Google's Gmail Privacy Policy notifies customers that deleted

e-mail will take immediate effect in the user's account view, but "[r]esidual copies
of deleted messages and accounts may take up to 60 days to be deleted from our

active servers and may remain in our offline backup systems." 54 Thus, e-mail that
has been deleted from a user's account and is no longer visible in the user's e-mail
account view may sit on the ISP's server indefinitely.
Clearly, ISP privacy policies do not provide a great deal of protection to users.
The ISPs have reserved the right to comply with subpoenas, warrants, court orders,
or other legal process. Thus, as Google notes in the Frequently Asked Questions
portion of its Privacy Policy, "the primary protections [users] have against
intrusions by the government are the laws that apply to where [they] live."55 This
Article now addresses those legal protections.
B.

FourthAmendment Protection

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires that search warrants be
issued only upon a finding of probable cause. 6 The Supreme Court defines

probable cause as "[a] reasonable ground for belief of guilt, ...

and that the belief

of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized."57
In order for a person to assert protection under the Fourth Amendment, she must
establish that the government violated her legitimate expectation of privacy1 8 This

inquiry has two parts: the person must establish (1) an actual or subjective

52. Google Privacy Policy (Oct. 14,2005), http://www.google.com/privacy.html ("[Google may]
share information with third parties in limited circumstances, including when complying with legal
process, preventing fraud or imminent harm, and ensuring the security of our network and services.");
Microsoft Online Privacy Statement, supra note 50 ("We may access and/or disclose your personal
information if we believe such action is necessary to: (a) comply with the law or legal process served
on Microsoft .. "); Yahoo! Privacy Policy, supra note 50 ("We respond to subpoenas, court orders,
or legal process, or to establish or exercise our legal rights or defend against legal claims .. "); see
also Dempsey, supra note 44, at 523 ("Virtually every privacy policy ... allows for disclosure in
response to a government demand.").
53. See Dempsey, supra note 44, at 523.
54. Gmail Privacy Policy, supra note 50. While Gmail does not promise it will remove deleted
e-mails within a certain timeframe, Gmail does state that it "will make reasonable efforts to remove
deleted information from our systems as quickly as is practical." About Gmail: More on Gmail and
Privacy (June 15, 2004), http://mail.google.com/mail/help/intl/en/more.html.
55. Google Privacy FAQ, http://www.google.com/privacyfaq.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
58. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
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expectation of privacy and (2) an objective expectation of privacy, or "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 59
Taking into account the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
it is unclear whether the Fourth Amendment provides adequate protection to webbased e-mail accounts. In UnitedStates v. Miller,6" the Court held that a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily provides to third
parties. 6 ' The Court reasoned that the government could obtain such information
from the third party "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it
will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed. 62 In the Court's view, when someone provides personal
information to third parties, he assumes the risk that the third party will reveal the
information to the government.63
Based on Miller, several lower courts have found that holders of web-based email accounts have no legitimate expectation of privacy regarding subscriber
information provided to ISPs. 64 Subscriber information includes a user's name,
address, birthday, and password.65 More importantly, lower courts have held that
once an e-mail message has been delivered to the recipient, the sender has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.66 As the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals has found, once an e-mail reaches its recipient, "the e-mailer would be

59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith, 442
U.S. at 740 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
60. 425 U.S. 435 (1976), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697.
61. Id.at 442-43. In Miller, the Court found that a bank depositor has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in financial information voluntarily provided to his bank and the bank's employees. Id.
62. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
63. Id.(citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971)).
64. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that electronic bulletin board
users lacked a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their subscriber information because they revealed
it to a third party); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding defendant
did not show a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding e-mail account information); United States
v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy
in subscriber information); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 1999)
(finding no restrictive agreement in the user's contract with the ISP, so the user had no reasonable
expectation of privacy).
65. Guest, 255 F.3d at 335.
66. See United States v. Jones, 149 Fed. App'x 954, 959 (1 th Cir. 2005) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in text messages that had reached the recipient); United States v. Lifshitz, 369
F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that although individuals possess a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their home computers, "[t]hey may not, however, enjoy such an expectation of privacy in
transmissions over the Internet or e-mail that have already arrived at the recipient"); Guest, 255 F.3d
at 333 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy once e-mail is delivered); United States v.
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that once the e-mail is received, there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,418 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
(finding that once an e-mail is delivered, "the transmitter no longer controls its destiny");
Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (finding no expectation of privacy
in e-mails forwarded to the police).
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analogous to a letter-writer, whose 'expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates
upon delivery' of the letter."67

Indeed, due to the manner in which ISP searches are conducted, the Fourth
Amendment may provide no protection at all to web-based e-mail accounts. As one
commentator notes, government investigators do not search the ISPs' servers
directly; rather, the investigators usually provide the ISPs with a grand jury
subpoena compelling copies of the users' e-mails.6" The government may issue a

grand jury subpoena even if the e-mails are protected by the Fourth Amendment.69
Additionally, unlike a search warrant, a grand jury may issue a subpoena in the
absence of probable cause.7 ° So long as the subpoena is reasonable, it will comply
with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.7
C. The Stored CommunicationsAct

Most likely realizing the lack of Fourth Amendment protection afforded
electronic communications, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986.72 Several provisions of the ECPA concern stored data
such as web-based e-mail.73 This portion of the statute is commonly referred to as
the Stored Communications Act (SCA). 74
In enacting the SCA, Congress chose to regulate government access to

communications provided by two types of communications services. The first type
of service, known as an "electronic communication service" (ECS), entails a
provider sending and receiving communications on behalf of the user. 75 The ECS
temporarily stores the communication pending delivery. In most cases, the

67. Guest, 255 F.3d at 333 (quoting United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995)).
68. Kerr, supra note 45, at 1211.
69. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 347 (4th Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 347-48 ("While the Fourth Amendment protects people 'against unreasonable searches
and seizures,' it imposes a probable cause requirement only on the issuance of warrants. Thus, unless
subpoenas are warrants, they are limited by the general reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment[,]... not by the probable cause requirement." (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (citation
omitted)).
71. Id. The Supreme Court requires that subpoenas be "sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in
purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome." See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967). Courts reason that subpoenas and warrants should have different
standards because the party upon whom the subpoena is served may challenge it before any intrusion
occurs. Searches and seizures, on the other hand, are conducted without prior notice. Thus, probable
cause is required in order to ensure compliance with the Constitution. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum,
228 F.3d at 347-48.
72. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2712 (2000)); see also Kerr, supra note 45, at 1212 ("The [ECPA]
creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections by statute, regulating the relationship
between government investigators and service providers in possession of users' private information.").
73. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711. The title of the statute applicable to stored data is known as the
Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access. Id.
74. See Dempsey, supra note 44, at 521; Kerr, supra note 45, at 1208.
75. The statute defines an electronic communications service as "any service which provides to
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
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communication is temporarily stored on the provider's server even after delivery.76
The second type of service is known as a "remote computing service" (RCS)."
When the SCA was enacted in 1986, consumers often used such services to store
extra files or process large amounts of data.78 RCSs often retained copies of their

customers' files for long periods of time.79 The main difference between an ECS
and an RCS is the amount of time the service stores the user's electronic files. An
ECS stores the user's files temporarily while an RCS stores the user's files
indefinitely.
The type of protection afforded to an electronic communication turns on two

factors: whether the ISP is an ECS or an RCS, and the amount of time the
communication has been stored with the provider.8 ° Under the SCA, the
government may access a communication stored by an ECS for 180 days or less
only pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of probable cause.8 1 If the

communication is stored with the ECS for more than 180 days, the government may
access it with a subpoena82 or a court order,83 but the government must give prior

notice to the subscriber.84 The standards for government access to communications
stored with an RCS are identical to those required for government access to a

communication stored for more than 180 days with an ECS.85
In sum, electronic communications, like web-based e-mails, are afforded no
more protection under the SCA than under the Fourth Amendment unless they have
been stored for 180 days or less, and assuming that ISPs who provide web-based
e-mails are even considered ECS providers. One commentator has argued that

providers of web-based e-mail are multifunctional and can serve as ECS and RCS

76. See Kerr, supra note 45, at 1213.
77. The statute defines a remote computing service as "the provision to the public of computer
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system." 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).
78. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
79. See id
80. The SCA defines "electronic storage" as "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire
or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of
such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). Thus, a customer's use of web-based e-mail would be
considered electronic storage under the SCA even if the customer deletes the e-mail immediately after
reading it. It follows that electronic storage would also include an ISP's retention of an e-mail in a
customer's inbox after the customer has read it but not deleted it. Indeed, if the ISP stores a copy of the
e-mail for backup purposes even after the customer has deleted it from her inbox, the retention of the
e-mail would still be considered electronic storage.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2000).
82. See supra Part 1II.B (discussing the reasonableness standard for the issuance of subpoenas).
83. For a court order to be issued under the SCA, the government must present "specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
84. Id. § 2703(b)(l)(B). The government may delay notice to the subscriber by up to ninety days
upon providing proof that there is reason to believe that notification might have an adverse result,
including the destruction of evidence, flight from prosecution, or intimidation of potential witnesses.
Id. § 2705(a)(l)-(2).
85. Id. §2703(a).
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for a single communication at any given time.86 For example, a provider that holds
an e-mail in intermediate storage until the recipient views the e-mail would be
considered an ECS. 87 As stated earlier, to access such an e-mail, the government
would need a search warrant. The warrant requirement under the SCA is identical
to the protection the Fourth Amendment provides to e-mails that have not yet been
delivered 8 8 However, if the recipient leaves the e-mail in her inbox (and on the
ISP's server) after reviewing it, the ISP may be serving as an RCS. 89 If this
characterization is correct, then the government would be allowed to access opened

e-mails with a subpoena or a court order, and neither of these authorizations
requires probable cause. 9° Under this scenario, the SCA provides no more
protection to opened e-mails than the Fourth Amendment provides.9

Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the SCA provides a great level of
protection for web-based e-mails. The marital communications privilege is the only
barrier preventing law enforcement access to confidential spousal communications

sent via e-mail. However, as Section IV demonstrates, the very nature of web-based
e-mail likely prevents the privilege from attaching at all.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
AS APPLIED TO WEB-BASED E-MAIL

Case law concerning the applicability of the marital communications privilege
and the third party presence rule is plentiful. Although courts have not yet

addressed whether the privilege applies to web-based e-mail, numerous analogies
demonstrate that the marital communications privilege is inapplicable to web-based

e-mail under current law.
A.

Applicability of the MaritalCommunicationsPrivilege to Letters

It is quite logical to compare an e-mail to a letter. Both are written forms of
communication where a writer drafts and sends a message to a recipient. Thus, if
the marital communications privilege applies to letters discovered by third parties,

86. Kerr, supra note 45, at 1215-16.
87. See supranote 75 and accompanying text; see also In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154
F. Supp. 2d 497, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding "temporary, intermediate storage" describes an email message being held by a third party).
88. See supranote 66 and accompanying text.
89. See Kerr, supra note 45, at 1216 ("The traditional understanding has been that a copy of
opened e-mail sitting on a server is protected by the RCS rules, not the ECS. rules The thinking is that
when an e-mail customer leaves a copy of an already-accessed e-mail stored on a server, that copy is
no longer 'incident to transmission' nor a backup copy of a file that is incident to transmission: rather,
it is just in remote storage like any other file held by an RCS.") (footnotes omitted). But see Theofel v.
Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding e-mails stored on an ISP's server following
delivery are usually stored for backup protection, thereby making the more stringent ECS rules
applicable).
90. See supranotes 82-84 and accompanying text.
91. See supra Part III.B.
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then it follows that the privilege should apply to web-based e-mails accessed by
ISPs in response to a court order, subpoena, or search warrant. Unfortunately, the
case law almost universally states that when a third party discovers the contents of
a letter between spouses, the marital communications privilege does not apply.
For example, in State v. Myers,9" defendant Myers was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter, aggravated robbery, and arson.93 On appeal, Myers argued that the
trial court erred in admitting into evidence letters he had written to his wife.94 The
letters contained damaging admissions of Myers's role in the alleged crimes. 95 The
State offered the letters into evidence not through Myers's wife, but through
Cassity, a friend of Myers.96 Myers's wife had lived in Cassity's basement for a
period of time. Three months after Myers's wife moved out of Cassity's basement,
Cassity found the letters under a mattress and gave them to another friend who
turned them over to law enforcement officers. 97
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in allowing the
letters into evidence.98 The court reasoned that the letters had fallen into Cassity's
hands inadvertently and without the connivance of Myers's wife. 99 The purpose of
the marital privilege-to protect the confidential relationship between spouseswould not be thwarted if a third person inadvertently acquires the communication
and discloses it. ' The court also found that construing the marital communications
privilege narrowly would ensure that relevant facts remain available to the court
unless very specific exceptions apply.'
The result in Myers is not unusual. In State v. Szemple, 102 the New Jersey
Supreme Court considered a similar factual situation. Szemple, charged with first
degree murder, wrote a letter to his wife prior to trial. 0 3 The letter contained a
description of a murder he had committed."° Szemple's wife had the letter in her
possession when she and her father moved her belongings from one residence to
another.0 5 During the move, the wife's father discovered the letter and stuck it in
his shirt.0 6 After reviewing the letter, he turned it over to the prosecutor on the
case. 0 7 Despite Szemple's objection based on the marital communications
privilege, the trial court allowed the letter into evidence.'0 8

92.
93.
94.
95.

640 P.2d 1245 (Kan. 1982).
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1249.
99. Id. at 1248.
100. Id. at 1248-49.
101. See id. at 1248.
102. 640 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1994).
103. Id. at 819.
104. Id. at 820.
105. Id. at 819.
106. Id.
107. ld. at 819-20.
108. Id. at 820.
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In finding that the marital communications privilege did not protect the letter,
the Szemple court noted that the privilege should be construed narrowly "as its only
effect [is] the suppression of relevant evidence."' 9 This approach to the evidentiary
privileges, according to the court, justifies the third party presence rule." 0 The court
reasoned that the privilege does not attach to the communication but to the
spouses."' Accordingly, no privilege is violated if the letter comes into in the hands
of a third party." 2 Finally, the court noted that Szemple and his wife should have
been more cautious. The court stated that Szemple knew or should have known that
the letter might fall into the hands of a third party because letters, unlike oral
conversations, have a "long life.""..3
The outcomes of Myers and Szemple are consistent with many cases involving
inadvertent disclosure of a spousal communication to a third party. For example,
in Ellis v. State,"4 the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that the marital
privilege did not apply to the defendant's suicide note to her husband where it was
found on the floor by police officers answering a 911 call. 1 5 The court reasoned
that the privilege "'does not protect against the testimony of third persons who
have.., secured possession or learned the contents"' of the communication." 6 In
Metcalfv. State,"7 the defendant wrote a letter to his wife from jail, placed it in an
unsealed envelope, and asked a soon-to-be-released inmate to deliver it."' The
Arkansas Supreme Court held that the privilege did not apply because the defendant
waived any potential confidentiality by handing over the unsealed letter to another
inmate.1 9 In Commonwealth v. May, 20 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
a letter sent from a prison inmate to his wife was not privileged, especially
considering that the inmate had signed a form permitting prison guards to review
all incoming and outgoing mail. 121 The facts of May are particularly analogous to
the use of web-based e-mail. The May court found the defendant's agreement with
the prison to be determinative on the issue of whether he had a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality.122 Similar to the defendant in May, a user of webbased e-mail signs an agreement granting the ISP the right to review incoming and

109. Id. at 821 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 82 (John William Strong, ed., 4th ed.
1992)).
110. Id.
I11. Id.at 822.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 824. According to the Szemple court, "[t]o obtain the benefit of the privilege, spouses
must take the precautions necessary to ensure that inter-spousal communications be kept confidential.
When they fail to do so, the privilege is lost." Id.
114. 570 So. 2d 744 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
115. Id. at 759.
116. Id. (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 82 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)).
117. 681 S.W.2d 344 (Ark. 1984).
118. Id. at 346.
119. Id.
120. 656 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1995).
121. Id. at 1342.
122. Id.
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outgoing messages. 123 Thus, a court would find that a user of web-based e-mail has
no viable claim of confidentiality in messages sent via the Internet. Finally, the
facts of Wolfle v. UnitedStates 24 are instructive. As stated earlier, Wolfle involved
a defendant who wrote a letter to his wife via his personal stenographer.125 The
his stenographer in the
Supreme Court held that the defendant's decision to involve
26
communication prevented the privilege from attaching. 1
Most of the scenarios mentioned above involve the inadvertent and sometimes
careless disclosure of confidential communications to a third party by one of the
spouses. Additionally, some of the scenarios involve the intentional disclosure to
the third party on the part of the communicating spouse. 27 A comparison of letters
to web-based e-mails makes sense regardless of whether the disclosure to the third
party is inadvertent or intentional. Even if a third party intentionally seeks to
discover the content of the communication, no violation of the privilege will occur.
When the writer of a web-based e-mail fails to protect the privilege by intentionally
or inadvertently disclosing the e-mail to the ISP, the case law regarding the
applicability of the privilege to letters indicates that the privilege would never apply
to web-based e-mail--disclosure of the communication is necessary for a writer to
successfully send an e-mail message.
B. Applicability of the MaritalCommunications Privilege
to Oral Communications
The case law regarding application of the marital communications privilege to
oral communications typically involves either live conversations overheard by a
third party or recorded messages discovered by a third party. Web-based e-mail is
probably more analogous to recorded messages, considering that both forms of
communication can be preserved and fall into the hands of a third party. However,
the distinction between live and recorded conversations makes no difference. Both
forms of communication, if overheard or discovered by a third party, are outside the
protection of the marital communications privilege.
In Proffitt v. State, 21 the Florida Supreme Court considered Proffitt's first
degree murder conviction. 29 At trial, the prosecution offered into evidence an oral
conversation between Proffitt and his wife wherein Proffitt confessed that he had
killed a man. 3 ' The state offered evidence of the conversation through the
testimony of Bassett, a woman who rented a room in Proffitt's two-bedroom mobile

123. See supra Part III.A.
124. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
125. Id. at 12; see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
126. Wotfie, 291 U.S. at 16-17.
127. Recall that intentional disclosure on the part of the recipient-spouse typically will not destroy
the privilege. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
128. 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976).
129. 1d. at 463.
130. Id,
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home.' 3' Although Bassett was not in Proffitt's room during
the conversation, she
32
was able to hear certain segments of the conversation. 1
In holding that the conversation was not privileged, the court found that the
Proffitts knew or should have known there was a possibility their conversation was
being overheard. 133 The court noted that the Proffitts must have realized Bassett
resided in the trailerbecause she made rental payments each month.134 Additionally,
the court found that the Proffitts did not attempt to keep their voices low because
Bassett heard their conversation through her closed door. 135 These facts, in the
court's opinion, demonstrated the Proffitts failed to take adequate steps to protect
the confidentiality of their conversation.'36
A conversation overheard by a third party will remain unprivileged even if the
37
third party intentionally eavesdrops on the conversation. Consider Horn v. State,1
in which Horn was convicted of second degree murder. 138 At trial, the state offered
the testimony of Joyce Walker, who worked as a nurse alongside Horn's wife.
Walker testified regarding a telephone conversation that occurred between Horn
and his wife while his wife was at work. 139 According to Walker, Mrs. Horn was
alerted that she had a telephone call while she was conversing with Walker. When
Mrs. Horn picked up the telephone, Walker lifted another telephone receiver
without Mrs. Horn's knowledge and listened to the conversation. 4 ° Walker testified
that she eavesdropped on the conversation because she was "being nosey.,141
On appeal, Horn asserted that the trial court erred in admitting Walker's
testimony because the conversation was protected by the marital communications
privilege. 42 The Florida Court of Appeals found that conversations overheard by
a third party are not privileged,
regardless of whether the third party acts
"surreptitiously or openly."' 143 Thus, the conversation between Horn and his wife

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 465.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; accordNashv. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 146 S.E. 726, 727 (W. Va. 1929) (finding
a conversation between spouses overheard by a boarder not privileged); see also State v. Sunmerlin,
675 P.2d 686, 694 (Ariz. 1983) (holding that conversations between defendant and his wife while police
officers were present were not privileged communications).
137. 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
138. Id. at 195.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.at 195-96.
142. Id. at 196.
143. Id. at 196 (quoting Annotation, Effect of Knowledge of Third Person Acquired by
Overhearing or Seeing Communication Between Husband and Wife Upon Rule as to Privileged
Communication 63 A.L.R. 107, 108-09 (1929)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/3

18

Story: Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Co

2006]

MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS & E-MAIL

was not protected by the privilege. 1" This approach to eavesdropping by third
parties is consistent with a very narrow application of the privilege.' 45
Likewise, case law indicates that recorded conversations are not privileged
when a third party gains access to the recording. In Wong-Wing v. State,1 46 the
defendant was charged with two counts of child sexual abuse. 4 7 The State offered
into evidence the transcript and recording of a message the defendant had left his
wife on her answering machine. 148 The defendant objected on the basis of the
spousal privilege. 149 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that the message
was not privileged because the defendant left the message on an answering machine
in a home his wife shared with her daughter and mother. 50 According to the court,
"when appellant left the message on the answering machine, he ran the risk that
someone other than [his wife] would retrieve the message."''5
The analogy between oral conversations and web-based e-mail is fairly sound.
Similar to the live conversation in Proffitt and the recorded message in Wong- Wing,
a person who chooses to draft a web-based e-mail has failed to take precautions to
prevent a third party from accessing the message. The writer deposits the e-mail
communication with the ISP, thereby running the risk that the ISP could access the
message and turn it over to the government. As demonstrated in Horn, even if the
ISP intentionally seeks to learn the content of the message, the privilege would not
apply to web-based
e-mails based on the application of the privilege to oral
52
conversations.'
C. The Effect of E-mail on Applicability of the ProfessionalPrivileges
It is further helpful to draw an analogy between the marital communications
privilege and the other evidentiary privileges, hereinafter referred to as the
"professional privileges." These privileges include the privileges between attorney
and client, physician and patient, psychotherapist and patient, and clergy and
communicant. Case law regarding the latter three privileges and the effect that
communication via e-mail might have on their applicability is virtually nonexistent. However, much commentary and a few court opinions have addressed
whether the use of e-mail vitiates the attorney-client privilege. Before discussing
whether it is appropriate to draw an analogy between the marital communications

144. Id.Ultimately, the court held that Walker's testimony regarding the conversation was
inadmissible because she violated Florida's wiretap statute by eavesdropping on the conversation. Id.
at 198-99.
145. See State v. Thorne, 260 P.2d 331, 336 (Wash. 1953) ("If the communication is heard by a
third party, even if by eavesdropping, the third party may testify to it, since the privilege protects only
successful confidences.") (citations omitted).
146. 847 A.2d 1206 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
147. Id. at 1208.
148. Id. at 1210.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1213.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
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privilege and the professional privileges, this Article explores what effect the use
of e-mail has on the application of the attorney-client privilege.
1. E-mail and the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, according to the Supreme Court, is "the oldest of
the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law."' 53 The
purpose of the privilege is to promote open and full communication between

attorney and client, "thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance
of law and the administration of justice."' 54 Some nuances of the attorney-client

privilege vary depending onjurisdiction, but the privilege arises under these general
circumstances:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the
protection be waived.'55
Under federal law, "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client ....156
Several legal commentators and some court opinions have addressed whether
the use of e-mail, by its nature, will result in waiver of the attorney client privilege.
In In re Asia Global Crossing,Ltd.,57 the court addressed whether the officers of

a bankrupt corporation waived any privilege they may have had in communications
between themselves and their personal attorneys when the officers communicated
with the attorneys via the corporate e-mail system. 5 Apparently, the e-mails
concerned potential disputes between the officers and the debtor-corporation. "' The
debtor-corporation's bankruptcy trustee claimed the communications that were

153. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing WIGMORE, supra note 27,
§ 2290).
154. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,403 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co., 449 U.S.
at 389).
155. WIGMORE, supranote 27, § 2292 (emphasis omitted).
156. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972)
(Proposed Rule 503). Although Rule 503 was never enacted, many courts cite this Rule with authority.
See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2005) ("While Congress did not adopt
any of the proposed rules concerning various privileges, courts have observed that Proposed Rule 503
is "'a useful starting place" for an examination of the federal common law of attorney-client
privilege' . . . [because the rule] . . . 'restates, rather than modifies, the common-law lawyer-client
privilege."') (citations omitted).
157. 322 BR. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
158. ld at 253.
159. Id at 256.
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stored on the debtor-corporation's e-mail servers were not privileged simply due

to the fact that they were sent by way of e-mail, which carries an inherent risk of
unauthorized disclosure. 160 The court found that, although e-mail carries some risk
of unauthorized disclosure, the prevailing view is that communication through email offers a reasonable expectation of privacy. 6 ' Therefore, according to the court,

attorney via e-mail does not, without
a client's decision to communicate with her
62

more, constitute waiver of the privilege. 1
The Nevada Supreme Court made an identical ruling in City ofReno v. Reno
Police Protective Ass'n. 1 63 In City of Reno, a union organization sued the city,

claiming unfair labor practices." 6 The state labor relations board admitted into

evidence a document authored by the city's labor relations manager and sent to the
city's attorney as an e-mail attachment.'65 The city claimed that the attorney-client
privilege applied to the document, but the labor relations board argued that
66
documents sent by e-mail cannot be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed, finding that "a document transmitted by email is protected by167the attorney-client privilege as long as the requirements of the
privilege are met."'
In making their rulings, the courts in In re Asian Global Crossingand City of
Reno relied on American Bar Association (ABA) and state bar association opinions
finding that communication by way of unencrypted e-mail does not violate a
lawyer's ethical obligation to maintain client confidentiality.168 Both opinions cited
ABA Opinion 99-413, issued in March 1999.169 Although the ABA opinion deals
with client confidentiality under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,' 70 some
legal commentators and court opinions have cited ABA Opinion 99-413 as
persuasive authority on the issue of whether the mere use of unencrypted e-mail

160. Id.at 253.
161. Id at 256.
162. Id.at 256.
163.59 P.3d 1212, 1218 (Nev.2002).
164. Id at 1215.
165. Id.at 1215.
166. Id.
at 1218-19.
167. Id.at 1218.
168. See In re Asian Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing as
examples Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'I & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2000-1,
(2000), availableat http://www.nycbar.org/Ethics/eth2000_l .htm; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I
Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) [hereinafter ABA Op. 99-413]; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
AttorneyResources/Ethics_Opinions/Committee onProfessionalEthicsOpinion_709.htm; and citing
for support City of Reno, 59 P.3d at 1218 (citing ABA Op. 99-413, supra)). Encryption is defined as
"a method of electronically or digitally coding a message sent online, whereby only the intended
recipient can unlock the code and read the message." Audrey Jordan, Note, Does UnencryptedE-Mail
Protect Client Confidentiality?, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 623, 624 (2004).
169. See cases cited supra note 168.
170. Model Rule 1.6(a) states, "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003).
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vitiates the attorney-client privilege. 171 While acknowledging that e-mail
communications have some inherent security problems, the opinion found that email "pose[s] no greater risk of interception or disclosure than other modes of
communication commonly relied upon as having a reasonable expectation of
privacy. '1 72 The ABA's blanket statement that all e-mail transmissions afford173a
generalization.

reasonable expectation of privacy is nothing less than a gross

However, the ABA and state bar associations 174 likely have found a reasonable
expectation of privacy to exist so that attorneys would not be forced to purchase

171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Dion Messer, To:
Client@ Workplace.com: PrivilegeatRisk?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 75, 75 n.2 (2004).
The Maryland Court of Appeals explored the relationship between Rule 1.6 and the attorney client
privilege in Newman v. State, 863 A.2d 321, 331-37 (Md. 2004). The court noted that "[t]he principle
of confidentiality is given effect in both bodies of law. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial
and other proceedings in which an attorney may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce
evidence adverse to his client," while Rule 1.6 "applies in all other situations that do not involve the
compulsion of law." Id.at 332 (citations omitted). Indeed, the court noted that Rule 1.6 has a broader
application than the attorney-client privilege because the rule "is not limited to 'matters communicated
in confidence by the client but also to all information related to the representation,' whether obtained
from the client or through the attorney's independent investigation ... "Id. (quoting MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt.).
172. ABA Op. 99-413, supra note 168.
173. See supra Part III.B. The ABA also stated in its opinion that the ECPA provides adequate
protection for e-mails accessed by third parties. ABA Op. 99-413, supra note 168. However, as this
article demonstrates, the ECPA does not provide a great deal of protection to e-mails stored on ISP
servers. See supra Part III.C.
174. Several state bar associations have opined that the use of unencrypted e-mail does not violate
an attorney's ethical duty to protect client confidences. See Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 98-2
(1998), availableat http://www.alaskabar.org/ada.cfin?id=4871; State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules
of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 97-04 (1997), availableat http://www.myazbar.org/ethics/printop.cfn?id= 480;
Del. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001), available at
http://www.dsba.org/AssocPubs/PDFs/2001-2.pdf; D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 281 (1998),
available at http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/ethics/legal ethics/opinons/opinion281.cfln; Haw.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Formal Op. 40 (2001), http://www.hsba.org/Legal Research/Hawaii/
Disc/FormalOpinion40.pdf, Iowa Supreme Court Board of Prof 1.Ethics & Conduct, Op. 97-01 (1997),
available at http://www.iowabar.org/main.nsf/ (follow "Professional Ethics" hyperlink; then follow
"Ethics Opinions" hyperlink; then follow the first "09/18/1997" hyperlink); Ky. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op.
E-403 (1998), availableat http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics opinions/kba-e-403.pdf; Mass. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 00-1 (2000), availableat http://www.massbar.org/publications/
ethics opinions/ (choose "Opinions for the Year of 2000"; follow "Read More" hyperlink for Opinion
No. 00-1); Minn. Lawyers Prof I Resp. Board, Op. 19 (1999), availableat http://www.courts.state.
mn.us/lprb/opl9.html; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 709 (1998), available at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/AttorneyResources/Ethics Opinions/CommitteeonProfessional Ethics Opinion_709.htm; N.C. State Bar, RPC 215 (1995), available at
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ (choose RPC 215 in "Select by Number" field); Board of Comm'rs on
Grievances & Discipline, Supreme Court of Ohio, Op. 99-2 (1999), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/1999/op_99-002.doc; S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 97-08 (1997), available at http://www.scbar.org/member/opinion.asp?opinionlD=469;
Board of Prof .Resp. of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Advisory Op. 98-A-650(a) (1998), availableat
http://www.tba.org/news/encrypt.html; Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 00-01
(2000), availableat http.//www.utahbar.org/rulesopspols/ethicsopinions/op_00 01 .html; Vt. Bar
Ass'n, Advisory Ethics Op. 97-05 (1997), available at http://www.vtbar.org/ezstatic/data/vtbar/
attomeyjudicialresources/ advisoryethicsopinions/1 997/97-05.pdf.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/3

22

2006]

Story: Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Co
MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS & E-MAIL

expensive encryption software or completely discontinue the use of e-mail to

75
communicate with clients.
Despite some problems with the reasoning behind ABA Opinion 99-413, it is
clear that state bar associations and some courts have relied upon the opinion in
finding that the use of unencrypted e-mail does not prevent the attorney-client

privilege from attaching. Thus, assuming that the analogy between the marital
communications privilege and the attorney-client privilege is proper, the use of
web-based e-mail would not endanger the privilege. Next, this Article explores
whether the marital communications privilege should be analogized to the attorneyclient privilege or any of the other evidentiary privileges.
2.

A Comparisonof the MaritalCommunicationsPrivilege to the Other
Evidentiary Privileges

The attorney-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and clergycommunicant privileges are both similar and dissimilar to the marital
communications privilege. The general principles of the attorney-client privilege
have already been discussed.176 The physician-patient privilege protects from
disclosure confidential communications made by a patient to his physician for the
purpose of medical treatment.' "The purpose of the privilege is to encourage
patients' full disclosure of information,
which will enable medical providers to
' 78
extend the best medical care possible."'
It must be noted that the federal courts do not recognize a physician-patient

privilege. 179 Indeed, in its proposed codification of the evidentiary privileges in
1972, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence

175. See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Should Lawyers Use E-Mail to Communicate with Clients?, 92
ILL. B.J. 572, 576 (2004) (stating that some in the legal community feel "[i]t doesn't make sense...
to impose restrictions on the use of e-mail so onerous that they would destroy its utility"). Clearly, an
encryption requirement would hurt the legal profession, due to the cost of such software and the
prevalence of e-mail usage in the legal profession. Messer, supra note 171, at 75 (citing Kathryn A.
Thompson, ABA Legal Resource Center, Technology Snapshot: The Results Are In, Presented at the
ABA Techshow, Chi., 111.(Apr. 4,2003), http://www.lawtechnology.org/presentations/techshow2003/
techshow2003 files/frame.htm) (stating that a 2003 technology survey revealed that 80% of attorneys
use e-mail one or more times a day and that 96% of those lawyers use e-mail for correspondence with
clients and colleagues).
176. See supra Part IV.C. 1.
177. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(l)(d) (2006) (stating that information acquired in
attending to a patient is privileged); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (LexisNexis 1998) (stating that
matters communicated to a physician in the course of professional business are protected); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02(d) (West 2000) (stating that information acquired while attending the patient is
privileged).
178. State v. Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Staat, 192
N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. 1971)).
179. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) ("The physician-patient evidentiary
privilege is unknown to the common law. In States where it exists by legislative enactment, it is subject
to many exceptions and to waiver for many reasons."); Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503,
506-07 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Unfortunately for [the plaintiff], federal common law does not recognize a
physician-patient privilege.").
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conspicuously left out any rule of privilege protecting the physician-patient
relationship. 80 The Committee reasoned that a general physician-patient privilege
was unnecessary so long as a psychotherapist-patient privilege was codified.' 8 ' The
United States Supreme Court apparently agrees with this position. While the Court
has found that the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is necessary for
proper diagnosis and treatment,182 ithas stated that "[t]reatment by a physician for
physical ailments can often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical
examination, objective information supplied by the patient, and the results of
diagnostic tests."' 83
The psychotherapist-patient privilege, recognized by the federal courts and

many state courts, protects from disclosure confidential communications between
a patient and her psychologist, social worker, or licensed counselor when such
communications assist the professional in making a complete diagnosis. 84 The
California legislature stated the privilege's purpose:
Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are dependent upon the fullest

revelation of the most intimate and embarrassing details of the
patient's life. .

.

.Unless a patient .. .is assured that such

information can and will be held in utmost confidence, he will be
disclosure upon which diagnosis and
reluctant to make the full
85
depend[].1
treatment...
Finally, the clergy-communicant' 86 privilege protects communications made to
81

a member of the clergy during the course of spiritual counseling or advice.

Similar to the purposes of the other professional privileges, the purpose of the

180. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts & Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241-42
(Proposed Rule 504 advisory committee's note 1972).
181. Id. at 242.
182. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
183. Id. at 10.
184. See, e.g., CAL. EvlD. CODE § 1012 (West 2006) (stating that psychotherapist and patient
communications are privileged); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1999) (stating that mental health
professionals who obtain information in the course of their employment are not allowed to disclose that
information); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 7005, 13862 (1999) (stating that client-social worker and
client-counselor relationships are privileged); MINN.STAT. ANN. § 595.02(g) (West 2000) (stating that
information obtained by psychologists or social workers engaged in psychological assessments is
privileged); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.83.110 (West 2006) (stating that communications between
client and psychotherapist are privileged).
185. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1014 S. Judiciary Comm. cmt. (West 1995), quoted in San Diego Trolley,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476, 480 (Ct. App. 2001).
186. The terminology clergy-communicant is used in lieu of priest-penitent in order to
acknowledge that the privilege applies not only to "Roman Catholic priests and their penitents, but also
communications between clergy and communicants of other denominations." In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384-85 (3d Cir. 1990).
187. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1999); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-803 (West
2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(3) (West Supp. 2006); see also In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 918 F.2d at 384 (finding that the privilege exists at federal common law).
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clergy-communicant privilege is to encourage the exercise of religious duty and
assist clergy members in performing their counseling duties. 8 '
At first glance, each of the professional privileges appears to be quite similar
to the marital communications privilege. After all, each privilege seeks to protect
confidential information. However, a closer look at the purposes and application of
the privileges reveals that the marital communications privilege is different from
the others, and these differences contradict the argument that courts should treat all
of the evidentiary privileges in the same manner.
The marital communications privilege is different from the professional
privileges in several ways. The origins of the marital communications privilege are
unique. Unlike the professional privileges, which originally existed to encourage
confidential communications between certain parties, 89 the marital privilege's
original purpose was to ensure that spouses would not have to face the humiliation
and embarrassment of testifying against each other.'9" The confidential
communications aspect of the privilege was not officially recognized until 1934,
many years after the Supreme Court recognized the testimonial aspect of the
privilege.' 9' At least one commentator has noted that, due to the different origins
of the two aspects of the marital privilege, case law regarding the marital
communications privilege is unhelpful in predicting how a court would rule on the
other privileges. 92
This difference in origin between the marital communications privilege and the
professional privileges could also explain the difference in application of the third
party presence rule. As demonstrated earlier, the third party presence rule prevents
the marital communications privilege from attaching where a third party is present
during an otherwise confidential communication between spouses. 193Courts have
applied the third party presence rule in the context of the professional privileges,
but the application has been less severe. With regard to the attorney-client privilege,
for example, courts recognize that the presence of a third party during
communications between an attorney and her client will generally waive the
privilege.' 94 However, if the third party is an agent of the attorney or someone
retained to aid in the preparation of the client's case, then the privilege will apply.'95

188. State v. Potter, 478 S.E.2d 742, 755 (W. Va. 1996).
189. See supra notes 153-56, 177-88 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
192. Hundley, supra note 6, at 265-66 n.9.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
194. See, e.g., Clagett v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 263, 270 (Va. 1996) (finding a conversation
between attorney and defendant in the hallway outside a courtroom unprivileged where the state's
forensic expert overheard the conversation and reported its details to the prosecutor).
195. See, e.g., PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 167 n.28 (Conn.
2004) ("We have recognized, however, that '[t]he presence of certain third parties... who are agents
or employees of an attorney or client, and who are necessaryto the consultation, will not destroy the
confidential nature of the communications."' (quoting Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757
A.2d 14, 22 (Conn. 2000))); State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66, 77 (Haw. 1997) (stating that the key to
determining whether the presence of a third party waives the privilege will turn on whether client and
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In fact, some courts have held that even where the third parties are not present at
the request of the attorney, their presence may not vitiate the privilege if the client

"'reasonably understood the conference to be confidential' notwithstanding the
'
presence of third parties."196
For example, in Rosati, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the presence of a child defendant's parents during conversations
with his attorney did not prevent application of the attorney-client privilege to those
conversations.' 97 Noting the parents' "vital" role as the child's confidants, the court
found that the child reasonably and unequivocally intended that the conversations
remain confidential.19 Indeed, even when the third party is neither an agent of the
attorney nor a confidant of the client, it has been held that a third party's presence
will not destroy the attorney-client privilege when the third party is serving as a
translator or interpreter in order to facilitate the communication between attorney
and client. 99
Likewise, the physician-patient privilege generally will not attach where a third
party is present. 200 However, the privilege does apply when the third party is present
20
to "aid physicians or transmit information to physicians on behalf of patients., 1
Additionally, when the third party's presence is required by law, courts have held
that any communications between physicians and patients overheard by the third
party will remain privileged.20 2 For example, where a police officer escorted the

defendant to the hospital following a car accident, the court held that
communications between the defendant and his nurse while in the presence of the
officer were privileged.2 3

attorney "knew or should have known that there was no reasonable expectation of confidentiality" due
to the presence of the third party (quoting United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 646 (5th Cir. 1981)));
People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185-86 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the presence of a third party
typically waives the privilege, but recognizing that "[a]n exception exists for statements made by a
client to the attorney's employees or in their presence because clients have a reasonable expectation that
such statements will be used solely for their benefit and remain confidential"); Floyd v. Floyd, 365 S.C.
56, 90, 615 S.E.2d 465, 483 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The privilege may extend to agents of the attorney.").
196. Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263,266-67 (R.I. 1995), quoted in Newman v. State, 863 A.2d
321, 333 (Md. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id. at 267.
198. Id.
199. See Osorio, 549 N.E.2d at 1185-86.
200. People v. Covington, 19 P.3d 15,20 (Colo. 2001) (citing People v. Deadmond, 683 P.2d 763,
770 (Colo. 1984)).
201. Darnell v. State, 674 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Springer v. Byram, 36 N.E.
361, 363 (Ind. 1894)); accord State v. Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (stating
that a third party's presence vitiates the physician-patient privilege unless the third party is "a necessary
and customary participant in the consultation or treatment" (citing State v. Kunz, 457 N.W.2d 265, 267
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990))).
202. See, e.g., People v. Jaffarian, 799 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (N.Y.J. Ct. 2005) (finding that the
required presence of a custodial police officer did not vitiate the physician-patient privilege).
203. Id.
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In the context of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the presence of a third
party generally will prevent application of the privilege. 2 4 However, when two
25

patients are participating in a joint counseling session, the privilege will attach. 1
Additionally, the third party presence rule works almost identically to the third
party presence rule in the context of the physician-patient privilege. Each of the
privileges will attach when the third party is a necessary and customary participant
in the consultation or treatment of the patient.20 6

Even in the context of the clergy-communicant privilege, which traditionally
applied to a penitent's private confessions to his priest,0 7 the modem view of the

privilege holds that a third party's presence will not destroy the privilege where the
third party is "essential to and in furtherance of" a communication between clergy
and communicant. 20 8 For example, when a member of the clergy has a group
discussion with five unrelated persons, the privilege would still apply if all parties
present were essential to the facilitation of the communication.2

9

In determining

whether a third party is essential to the furtherance of the communication, the Third
Circuit has held that courts must inquire into the nature of the communicant's
relationship to the third party as well as the pastoral counseling practices of the

clergy members in the relevant religious denomination.210
Only in the context of the marital communications privilege do courts apply the
third party presence rule virtually without exception.2 1 Several explanations exist

204. Redding v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr., 878 P.2d 483,485 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); accordState
v. Branch-Wear, 695 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Me. 1997) (finding statements made in front of third parties are
not privileged).
205. Redding, 878 P.2d at 486; accordCity of Cedar Falls v. Cedar Falls Cmty. Sch. Dist., 617
N.W.2d 11,22 (Iowa 2000) (finding that the presence of third parties during group counseling sessions
did not defeat the privilege).
206. See supranote 201 and accompanying text; see also State v. Gullekson, 383 N.W.2d 338,340
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the psychotherapist-patient privilege will attach where the third
party is necessary (quoting State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn. 1984))).
207. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 386 (3d. Cir. 1990).
208. Id; accordPeoplev. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307,321 (111. App. Ct. 2004) ("[A]n admission
or confession is not privileged if made to a clergy member in the presence of a third person unless such
person is 'indispensable' to the counseling or consoling activity of the clergy member." (citing People
v. Diercks, 411 N.E.2d 97, 101 (I11.App. Ct. 1980))).
209. In re GrandJury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 386-87.
210. Id. at 387. The Third Circuit noted that delving into the pastoral counseling practices of a
particular denomination poses no First Amendment problem:
[W]e believe that establishing the pastoral counseling practices of a particular
denomination to ascertain the types of communications that the denomination
deems spiritual and confidential is both a necessary and a constitutionally
inoffensive threshold step in determining whether a privilege interdenominational
in nature applies in light of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
Id. at 387 n.21.
211. See supra Part IV.A-B. Note that third party presence will not destroy the marital
communications privilege where the third party is incapable of understanding the communication. See
State v. Bohon, 565 S.E.2d 399,403-04 (W. Va. 2002) (holding that the presence of a married couple's
eight-month-old child during confidential spousal communications did not vitiate the privilege). Butsee
State v. Muenick, 498 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (finding the marital communications
privilege inapplicable to statements made in the presence and hearing of the couple's ten- and eleven-
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for the difference in treatment. First, because the marital privilege originated from
society's distaste for requiring one spouse to betray the other, 2 society may be less
concerned if a third party is able to disclose the communication without the
assistance or connivance of the recipient-spouse. 1 3
Additionally, courts may apply the third party presence rule more strictly in the
context of the marital communications privilege because the marital privilege is
more limited than the professional privileges. In Glover v. State,1 4 the Indiana
Supreme Court found that the marital communications privilege does not apply as
broadly as the professional privileges, in part because promoting disclosure
between the parties is not the primary purpose of the marital communications
privilege. 215 The court noted that the existence of the professional privileges
facilitates open communication between the professionals and their clients.2 16 The
marital communications privilege, on the other hand, exists to ensure the health of
marriages and prevent marital conflict." 7 The court found that "[a] desire to
promote disclosure between spouses may be a secondary consideration in support
of the marital privilege, but that factor is less critical than the need of an attorney
to counsel or a doctor to treat based on complete and accurate information. 2 8
Thus, if it is true that marital harmony, rather than the promotion of confidential
disclosure, is the primary purpose of the martial communications privilege, it
follows that the disclosure of spousal communications by third parties should not
implicate the privilege.
The most likely reason for the difference in application of the third party
presence rule in the context of the marital communications privilege centers on the
idea of necessity. With regard to the professional privileges, the theme of necessity
is present in the court decisions allowing the privileges to apply despite the
presence of third parties. Where the third party is present to assist the

year-old sons).
212. See supra notes 10, 14; see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE § 5.31, at 397 (3d ed. 2003) ("It is repellant to force husband or wife to breach the trust of
marriage by becoming the instrument of the other's criminal conviction.").
213. See Hundley, supra note 6, at 265 n.9 (stating that courts likely enforced the third party rule
based on the assumption that a husband would not physically abuse his wife for disclosing confidential
communications if a third party testifies regarding the communication).
214. 836 N.E.2d 414 (Ind. 2005).
215. Id.at 421.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.But see Ulibarri v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 449,454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that
professional communications have the ethical and disciplinary rules of each profession as an additional
source of protection). The court stated that "[b]ecause there is no corresponding set of ethical and
disciplinary rules for the marital relationship, judicial enforcement of the marital communications
privilege is all that protects a spouse from being compelled to testify about marital communications."
Id.(citation omitted). If this reasoning is correct, it could be argued that the marital communications
privilege, the most vulnerable of all privileges, should be applied more broadly than the professional
privileges.
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professional, 219 comfort the layperson, 221 comply with the requirements of the
law, 2 ' or further the communication itself,222 each of the professional privileges
will attach because the third party's presence is necessary. As the Supreme Court
noted in Wolfie, "where it is the policy of the law to throw its protection around
knowledge gained or statements made in confidence, it will find a way to make that
protection effective by bringing within its scope the testimony of those whose
participation in the confidence is reasonably required. '223 On the other hand, in the
context of the marital communications privilege it is understood, as the Wolfle court
noted, that husband and wife may communicate confidentially and effectively
without the aid of a third party. 224 Thus, while an interpreter's presence during a
communication between attorney and client did not destroy the privilege, 225 a letter
sent from a husband to his wife was not privileged when the husband knew of his
wife's reading difficulties and she sought assistance from a third party to
understand the content of the letter.226
The focus on necessity suggests the marital communications privilege should
not apply to spousal communications sent via web-based e-mail. Certainly there are
other avenues for spousal communication that do not require the involvement of
third parties. While communication by way of e-mail may be necessary for the
arms-length relationship between attorney and client or physician and patient, the
marital relationship is something other than an arms-length relationship. The
marital relationship is characterized by its intimacy, and communication by way of
e-mail is at odds with such intimacy.
3. Legislative Solutions

At least three legislative enactments address whether the use of electronic
communication should vitiate the evidentiary privileges. The ECPA states that,
"[n]o otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in
accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its
privileged character., 227 While it may appear that this statute settles the question of
whether e-mails obtained by law enforcement will retain their privileged status, this
section of the ECPA specifically applies to "this chapter" and not the SCA, which
is found in a different chapter.228

219. See supra notes 194, 201 and accompanying text.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 197-98.
221. See supra text accompanying note 202.
222. See supra notes 199, 205, 208 and accompanying text.
223. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 16 (1934).
224. Id. at 16-17.
225. See supra text accompanying note 199.
226. Grulkey v. United States, 394 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1968).
227. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (2000).
228. Id.; see David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About TransmittingClient Confidences by
InternetE-Mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 459, 476 (1998) (stating that "§ 2517(4) does not apply to
'stored communications"').
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Additionally, a New York statute states the following: "No communication
privileged under this article shall lose its privileged character for the sole reason
that it is communicated by electronic means or because persons necessary for the
delivery or facilitation of such electronic communication may have access to the
content of the communication. '229 California has enacted a statute with virtually
identical language.23 °
These three statutes address electronic communications and the evidentiary
privileges, but their application is probably too broad. Because of the differences
in the nature and origins of the marital communications privilege as compared to
the professional privileges, legislative enactments seeking to maintain the integrity
of all the evidentiary privileges despite disclosure through web-based e-mail fail to
address the issue of whether the marital privilege shouldapplyto web-based e-mail.
These statutes provide a practical answer to law enforcement officers and the
courts, but they do not answer the question of whether communication via webbased e-mail is at odds with the purpose of the marital communications privilege.
Indeed, one could argue that if the involvement of a third party is necessary for
spouses to communicate with each other, then the marital communications privilege
may no longer serve its intended purpose. Thus, Part V addresses abrogation of the
marital communications privilege.
V.

THE FUTURE OF THE MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE

As stated earlier, the purpose of the marital communications privilege is to
promote marital harmony and protect marital confidences. 1 Many commentators
have criticized the marital communications privilege. These commentators have
waged a host of arguments, the strongest being that the privilege does not satisfy
its stated purpose.232 In determining the viability of the evidentiary privileges, legal
scholars recognize at least two approaches.233 Part V applies each approach to the
marital communications privilege in order to determine whether the privilege
should continue to exist.

229. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney Supp. 2006).
230. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 917(b) (West Supp. 2006) ("A communication between persons in
a relationship listed in subdivision (a) does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it
is communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or
storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication.").
Subsection (a) lists the relationships that qualify for the privilege under California law, including
"lawyer-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, clergy-penitent, [and] husband-wife." Id.

§ 917(a).
231. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
233. See infra Parts V.A-B.
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A.

The UtilitarianApproach

Dean Wigmore created the utilitarian, or the "instrumental," approach in the
United States.234 Wigmore fashioned the approach as a new framework by which
courts could analyze new privileges and revisit existing privileges. 235 According to
Wigmore's approach, four conditions are necessary before a court may recognize
an evidentiary privilege:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communication must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.236

Under Wigmore's approach, unless each of the four criteria is satisfied, no
privilege can exist. 237 Professor Imwinkelried suggests that Wigmore intentionally
created a very rigorous test because he advocated greater limits on the creation of
new evidentiary privileges and the review of existing privileges.238 Many courts
have accepted Wigmore's approach as the framework that should be used to
determine whether the creation of a new privilege is warranted. 239 The application
of these criteria to the marital communications privilege provides insight on
whether the privilege should exist.
The first factor is fairly subjective. It involves a determination of whether the
communicating spouse intended to make a confidential disclosure. In most
instances, this factor can be established with ease. However, one could argue that
if the communicating spouse sends a web-based e-mail to the recipient spouse with

234. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 3.1, at 119-22
(Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002).
235. Id. § 3.2.3, at 130.
236. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2285, at 527.
237. Id.
238. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 234, § 3.2.3, at 130.
239. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting WIGMORE, supra
note 27, § 2285) (using the Wigmore factors to determine if a privilege exists); Doe v. United States,
711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d. Cir. 1983) (citing WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2285) (using the Wigmore
factors to determine if a privilege exists); ACLU of Miss., Inc. v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir.
Unit A Mar. 1981) (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970)) (using the
Wigmore factors to determine if a privilege exists); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1068 n.10
(9th Cir. 1976) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2285) (noting that privileges have been accepted
only if they satisfy Wigmore's criteria).
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the realization that the third party ISP will maintain a copy of the communication,
then the communicating spouse probably did not intend that the communication be
confidential. On the other hand, even if the communicating spouse knew or should
have known that the communication was not confidential, he or she may have
possessed a subjective belief that the communication was confidential. Thus, the
first factor would be established even if the communicating spouse disclosed
confidential information via web-based e-mail.
Wigmore's second factor is much more difficult to establish. The second factor
requires the proponent of the privilege to establish that confidentiality is essential
to the maintenance of a good relationship between the parties. In other words, the
proponent must show that, absent the privilege, a similarly situated person would
be deterred from disclosing the confidential information.24 °

Wigmore created the second factor on a theory that any privilege satisfying this
factor would never work to block admissible evidence. In Wigmore's view, if it is
established that the communications would not have been made in the absence of
the privilege, then elimination of the privilege would likely result in the
communicator's decision not to disclose the information. "In short, there is an
evidentiary 'wash'-while evidence might be excluded at trial pursuant to a
privilege objection, but for the privilege the evidence would not have come into
existence. 24 ' The Supreme Court agrees with this approach. In Swidler & Berlin
v. United States, 242 a case involving the attorney-client privilege, the Court noted
that clients would probably not share confidential information with their attorneys
in the absence of the privilege, thereby making "the loss of evidence ...

more

243

apparent than real.
Many authors have argued that the marital communications privilege fails
Wigmore's second factor because most spouses do not confide in each other based
on the existence of the marital communications privilege. 2' Rather, spouses confide
in each other due to the trust and affection present in the relationship. 2 5 As one
commentator notes:

240. IMWINKELRIED, supranote 234, § 3.2.3, at 132 (citing WIGMORE, supranote 27, § 2285); see
also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (noting that privileges should be used only to
protect communications "which might not have been made absent the privilege" (citations omitted)).
241. IMWINKELRIED, supranote 234, § 3.2.3, at 135 (footnote omitted); see also Melanie B. Leslie,
The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 31, 31, quoted in
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 234, § 3.2.3 at 135 n.96 ("In a perfect [Wigmorean] world, however, the
privilege would shield no evidence. Privilege generates the communication that the privilege protects.").
242. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
243. Id. at 408; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996) ("If the privilege were
rejected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be
chilled .... Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants such as [plaintiff]
seek access-for example, admissions... by a party-is unlikely to come into being.").
244. See, e.g., DePrez, supra note 14, at 137 ("It is also unrealistic to assume that the rules of
evidence have any effect on intimate relationships and the confidences which they encompass.").
245. Id.
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[T]he contingency of courtroom disclosure would almost never
(even if the privilege did not exist) be in the minds of the parties
in considering how far they should go in their secret
conversations. What encourages them to fullest frankness is not
the assurance of courtroom privilege, but the trust they place in
the loyalty and discretion of each other .... In the lives of most

people appearance in court as a party or a witness is an
exceedingly rare and unusual event, and the anticipation of it is
not one of those factors which materially influence in daily life
the degree of fullness of marital disclosures.246

Indeed, commentators have noted that no evidence exists to suggest that married
lawyers, who are aware of the marital communications privilege, enjoy more
marital bliss than uninformed laypersons.247 Apparently, Wigmore agreed with this
analysis arguing that no persuasive data showed that the recognition of the privilege
was necessary to facilitate communications between spouses

48

Therefore, with

regard to Wigmore's second factor of essential confidentiality, "while the danger
of injustice from suppression of relevant proof is clear and certain, the probable
benefits of the rule of privilege in encouraging marital confidences and wedded
harmony [are] ...marginal. 249

Wigmore's third factor requires the advocate of the privilege to show that the
relation is one that, in the opinion of the community, should be "sedulously
fostered." In order to satisfy this criterion, the advocate of the privilege must show
that society places a high degree of value on the relationship that the privilege seeks
to protect.250
The Supreme Court has recognized the marital relationship as one worth
protecting, finding marriage to be "the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress. 25' Indeed, the
Court has described the marital relationship as the most important relationship in
life.252 The Supreme Court has also recognized society's interest in protecting the
privacy of the marital relationship. In Griswoldv. Connecticut,253 the Court stated
that it found "repulsive" the idea of allowing the government "to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms., 254 Considering the value that the Court places on

246. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supranote 29, § 86.
247. Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observationson the Law ofEvidence: Family
Relations, 13 MINN. L. REv. 675, 682 (1929).
248. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2332.
249. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supranote 29, § 86.
250. Id. § 3.2.3, at 134.
251. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
252. Id. at 205.
253. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
254. Id. at 485-86. The GriswoldCourtdescribed the concept of privacy in the marital relationship
in the following manner:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
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the institution of marriage, it may make sense that confidential communications
between spouses should be protected.
Wigmore's final factor requires proof that the injury to the relationship that
would result from disclosure of the communication is greater than the benefit
gained from disclosure of the communication.255 The analysis of Wigmore's second
factor is important in the analysis of the fourth factor. 6 If, as the second factor
requires, the existence of the privilege is essential to the proper functioning of the
relationship that is to be protected, then the relationship would suffer severely from
the disclosure of confidential information. If, on the other hand, the privilege has
no effect on whether the parties to the relationship engage in confidential
communications, then the disclosure of confidential information would not cause
an injury to the relationship that is greater than the benefit that the justice system,
and society at large would gain from the disclosure of the information.
With regard to the marital privilege, it is very likely that Wigmore's second and
fourth factors cannot be established. Wigmore's utilitarian or instrumental approach
is based on the idea that the evidentiary privileges should exist only as an
instrument or a means to accomplish another goal.257 Specifically, Wigmore felt that
evidentiary privileges should be recognized only where they are "a necessary means
of promoting a valuable, confidential social relation. 258 Because the marital
communications privilege is not necessary to the promotion of the marital
relationship, the privilege should not exist based on Wigmore's approach.
While Wigmore's utilitarian model is widely accepted by courts, it is not
without its critics. Indeed, Wigmore himself questioned whether the utilitarian
model would support the case for a spousal privilege. 259 However, rather than
arguing for abrogation of the marital communications privilege, some have argued
that a different model should be applied in hopes of justifying the privilege's
existence.
B.

The HumanisticApproach

The humanistic approach to the evidentiary privileges suggests that privileges
should exist, not to affect the communicator's behavior, but to protect certain
personal rights such as informational privacy or individual autonomy. 260 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the constitutional right to privacy may protect

better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id.at 486.
255. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2285.

256. See supra notes 240-49 and accompanying text.
257. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 234, § 5.1.1, at 257.
258. Id.
259. WIGMORE, supranote 27, § 2333.
260. IMWINKELRIED, supranote 234, § 5.1.2, at 259.
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"the individual interest in avoiding [the] disclosure of personal matters," as well 261
as
"the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."
The humanistic approach has moral underpinnings. Its promoters argue that certain
concepts, namely privacy and autonomy, must be safeguarded despite the effect that
26 2
the exercise of these rights might have on the admissibility of relevant evidence.
1.

The InformationalPrivacy Rationale

The first rationale for the humanistic approach to the evidentiary privileges
involves the idea of informational privacy. According to Professor Imwinkelried,
263
"the immediate result of denying a privilege is a loss of informational privacy."

Thus, the humanistic approach suggests that the evidentiary privileges exist to
protect every person's right to confide in certain people without fear that the
government will compel disclosure of the information. 2"
Applying the informational privacy rationale to the marital communications
privilege, it is clear that the privilege should exist to protect one's right to confide
privately in his or her spouse. In 1973, as an expression of his opposition to
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, which would have abolished the marital
2 65
communications privilege while codifying the spousal testimonial privilege,
Professor Charles Black drafted a letter to Congressman William L. Hungate, the

chairman of the House Special Subcommittee on Reform of the Federal Criminal
261. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). Some argue that the Supreme Court never
explicitly recognized a constitutional right to informational privacy. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
HistoricalCycle in the Law of EvidentiaryPrivileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with
the Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. RaV. 241, 258-59 (2002). Additionally, some lower
courts have refused to recognize a constitutional right to informational privacy. See, e.g., Cutshall v.
Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that although the Whalen Court acknowledged
"the possibility of an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," it only cited
concurring and dissenting opinions). In contrast, several lower courts have recognized a constitutional
right to informational privacy. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d
Cir. 1980) (holding that there is a constitutional right to privacy of medical records kept by an employer,
but that the government's interest in protecting the safety of employees was sufficient to permit their
examination); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978) (identifying a "right to
confidentiality" and holding that balancing is necessary to weigh intrusions); see also Barry v. City of
New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.1983) (applying a balancing or intermediate scrutiny test to
determine whether financial disclosure laws violated the right to confidentiality); Haw. Psychiatric
Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Haw. 1979) (holding that disclosure of psychiatric
records implicates the constitutional right to confidentiality); McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355,
1381 (D.N.J. 1978) ("The analysis in Whalen... compels the conclusion that the defendant.., must
justify the burden imposed on the constitutional right of privacy .... ).
262. See generallyIMWINKELRIED, supranote 234, at 257-61 (discussing the general humanistic
focus on protecting privacy in various forms).
263. 1MWINKELRIED, supra note 234, § 5.3.2, at 304.
264. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codificationa Second Chance-TestimonialPrivileges and
the FederalRules ofEvidence, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 769, 794-95 (2002). But see IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 234, § 5.3.2, at 304 (arguing that the recognition of evidentiary privileges should not be tied to the
right to informational privacy because the existence of the right "is not settled as a matter of Supreme
Court jurisprudence").
265. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
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Laws. 66 In the letter, Professor Black argued that abrogation of the marital
communications privilege would result in the violation of each spouse's right to
privacy:
[T]he meaning of the Rule (made entirely clear in the Advisory
Committee's comments) is that, however intimate, however
private, however embarrassing may be a disclosure by one spouse
to another, or some fact discovered, within the privacies of
marriage, by one spouse about another, that disclosure or fact can
be wrung from the spouse under penalty of being held in
contempt of court, if it is thought barely relevant to the issues in
anybody's lawsuit for breach of a contract to sell a carload of
apples.... It seems clear to me that this Rule trenches on the area
of marital privacy so staunchly defended by the Supreme
Court

....

2 67

The informational privacy approach promotes the idea that everyone has the right
to confide in certain persons without fear of disclosure to outsiders. Considering the
value that society and the courts place on the marital relationship, it stands to reason
that private information shared between spouses should be protected by an
evidentiary privilege. Thus, the informational privacy rationale supports the
continued existence of the marital communications privilege.
2.

The Individual Autonomy Rationale

A second rationale for the humanistic approach is the concept of individual
autonomy or decisional privacy.268 Under this rationale, the evidentiary privileges
should exist to help a person "effectively exercise autonomy by facilitating
intelligent, independent life preference choices., 269 The existence of certain
evidentiary privileges will arguably promote autonomy by allowing individuals the
ability to freely consult confidants about "fundamental life preference choices"
without fear of government intrusion. 270 Thus, if a particular evidentiary privilege
promotes such free-flowing communication, then the humanistic approach supports
its existence. For example, some commentators have argued that the attorney-client
privilege promotes individual autonomy in the following manner: "Ready access
to legal champions can empower individuals without legal training to assert and
defend their rights. Making communications privileged ensures that the dialogue

266. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a
Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 46.
267. Id. at 48.
268. IMW1NKELRIED, supra note 234, § 5.3.3, at 308.
269. Id. § 5.3.3(c), at 327.
270. Id.
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between the attorney and client' 271
is frank and encourages individuals to explore their
legal options with an advisor.
In order to determine if a particular privilege will facilitate intelligent,
independent choices, the proponents of the individual autonomy rationale have
created a three factor test. According to the test, courts must determine the

following:
(1) [W]hether the relation is a consultative one; (2) whether there
is a relatively firm societal understanding that the consultant's
duty is to help the other person pursue his or her interests and
make a choice; and (3) whether the consultative relationship is
centered on choices in an area of the person's life implicating a
fundamental life preference.272
These three criteria are problematic when applied to the marital
communications privilege. The first criterion requires that the relationship be a
consultative one. While it is true that a marriage sometimes may be a consultative
relationship, it is not inherently consultative as are the relationships between
attorney-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and clergycommunicant. In order to determine if the spousal relationship satisfies this first
criterion, courts would be forced to inquire into the nature of the specific
communication at issue in order to determine if the communicating spouse was
seeking consultation. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to delve into the
content of a private communication between spouses. 27 3 Instead, courts prefer an
absolute rule that confidential communications between spouses will be considered
privileged because this rule provides a measure of security to married couples that
"their private communications will be protected and will not be susceptible to
exposure by an after-the-fact determination., '27' Therefore, even if the first criterion
of the individual autonomy rationale calls for recognition of the marital

271. Richard Lavoie, Making a List and Checking It Twice: Must Tax Attorneys Divulge Who's
Naughty andNice?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 141, 147 n. 14 (2004), see also Steven Goode, Identity, Fees,
and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307, 317 (1991) ("The [attorney-client]
privilege enables lawyers to help their clients understand the nature of their legal problems, thereby
allowing clients to participate in decisions concerning their legal destiny. By thus fostering selfknowledge and client involvement, the privilege promotes individual autonomy.").
272. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 234, § 5.4.3(a), at 411.
273. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 344 So. 2d 915, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a court
should not inquire whether a communication between spouses was incident to, rather than because of,
the marital relationship), overruled on other grounds by Ruffin v. State, 397 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla.
1981). According to the Smith court, such an inquiry concerning causation could have a "potential
chilling effect" upon confidential spousal communications. Id.It is important to note that, in most
jurisdictions, the content of a spousal communication can affect whether the privilege will attach if the
communication was made in furtherance of a crime where the spouses acted jointly or if one spouse is
charged with a crime against the other spouse or the child of the other spouse. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID.
504(d) (listing the exceptions to the marital privilege rule); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504(3)(b) (West 1999)
(same); HAW. R. EVID. 505(c) (2006) (same).
274. Smith, 344 So. 2d at 919.
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communications privilege, the privilege might not apply depending on the
communicating spouse's purpose, thereby making the privilege qualified or
conditional rather than absolute.275

The second criterion of the individual autonomy rationale is also problematic
when applied to the marital communications privilege. The second criterion
requires a firm societal understanding that the consultant's duty is to help the other
person pursue his or her interests and make a choice.276 With regard to the

professional privileges, this criterion can be established with ease. In the context of
each of the professional privileges, society has accepted the idea that the
professional in the relationship has a duty to advise and possibly assist the
layperson in making a decision. Any contractual relationship between the
professional and the layperson regarding payment for services rendered would only
buttress the existence of such a duty. The professional relationships are fiduciary
in nature in that "confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and influence
result on the other." 277 In each of the professional relationships, the professional has
undertaken a fiduciary duty to act primarily for the benefit of the layperson.27 8

275. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 234, § 5.4.4(a) at 420 ("[T]he shift to an autonomy-based
humanistic rationale should prompt the courts to classify more privileges as qualified."). While some
scholars advocate a move from absolute to qualified or conditional privileges, courts are reluctant to
classify the marital communications privilege as conditional. See infra text accompanying note 293.
276. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 234, § 5.4.3(a), at 411.
277. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 432 (6th ed. abridged 1991); accordDairyFarmers of Am., Inc.
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 292 F.3d 567, 572 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[A] 'fiduciary relationship' is deemed to exist
when 'a special confidence [is] reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in
good faith, and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence."' (quoting Vogel v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 801 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990))); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm
Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1163 (10th Cir. 2000) ("A fiduciary relationship exists when
one person is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the
scope of their relationship. A fiduciary relationship can arise when one party occupies a superior
position relative to another." (quoting Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 916 P.2d 643, 646 (Colo. Ct. App.
1996))).
278. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the attorneyclient relationship to be "inherently fiduciary"); Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 354 (Fla. 2002)
(finding that a fiduciary relationship exists between psychotherapist and patient); State ex rel.Kitzmiller
v. Henning, 437 S.E.2d 452,455 (W. Va. 1993) (concluding that a fiduciary relationship exists between
physician and patient). With regard to the clergy-communicant relationship, courts are split on whether
it is constitutionally sound to hold members of the clergy to a fiduciary duty. Some courts are of the
opinion that analyzing the scope of any fiduciary duty owed by a member of the clergy to his or her
parishioner would require the court's "excessive entanglement with religion." H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913
S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)). Other courts have allowed breach of fiduciary duty claims by parishioners claiming that
members of the clergy engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior during the course of pastoral
counseling because the claims arose from conduct that could not be defended on the basis of a sincerely
held religious belief or practice. See Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 376 (Fla. 2002); F.G. v. MacDonell,
696 A.2d 697, 702-03 (N.J. 1997); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988). In sum,
most courts hold that a fiduciary relationship between clergy and communicant may exist depending
on the facts of the case. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213,
1240 (Miss. 2005) (holding that a fiduciary relationship will not exist merely because of a priest's status
but that a fiduciary relationship may arise from factual circumstances); Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d
1220, 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that a clergy-parishioner relationship "may be fiduciary in

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/3

38

Story: Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Co
2006]

MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS & E-MAIL

In contrast, many courts have held that the marital relationship is not inherently

fiduciary.279 These courts have held that a marriage is not inherently fiduciary
because kinship alone is not enough to create the protected relationship. 280 Thus,

"more than the gratuitous reposal of a secret to another who happens to be a family
member is required to establish a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and
confidence. '281 Additionally, most fiduciary relationships are based on an

imbalance of knowledge and influence between the parties.282 In the context of the
attorney-client relationship, for example, the attorney is typically more

knowledgeable about the law and, as a consequence, will wield a great amount of
influence with the layperson in making certain decisions. In contrast, the modem
conceptualization of marriage is based on mutual trust, commitment, and decisionmaking.283 While one spouse may be more knowledgeable than the other, such an
imbalance is not inherent in the relationship. As a result, it makes sense that no
fiduciary duty should exist between spouses unless they have entered into some

other transaction that gives rise to the duty. The second criterion of the individual
autonomy rationale requires society's recognition that one party must subordinate
his or her own interests to those of the other party. While society may be prepared

to make such a recognition with regard to certain professional relationships, the

nature," depending on the facts of the case) (citing Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 322 (Colo.
1993)).
279. See, e.g., Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 ("[M]arriage does not, without more, create a fiduciary
relationship."); In re Estate of Karmey, 658 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Mich. 2003) ("[M]arriage is not a
relationship that has traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary duties."). But see Sidden v.
Mailman, 563 S.E.2d 55, 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the marital relationship creates a
fiduciary duty where the spouses engage in business transactions because the "marital relationship is
the 'most confidential of all relationships' (quoting Eubanks v. Eubanks, 159 S.E.2d 562, 567 (N.C.
1968))).
280. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (quoting United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
281. Id.
282. See In re Estate ofKarmey, 658 N.W.2d at 799 n.3 ("Although a broad term, 'confidential
or fiduciary relationship' has a focused view toward relationships of inequality."); Barbara A. v. John
G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("The essence of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship is that the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the person in whom trust and
confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert unique
influence over the dependent party.").
283. For a description of the changing conception of marriage, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
DecisionmakingAbout Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9, 9-14 (1990). Scott argues that a
change in gender roles has affected society's conceptualization of marriage:
Ideal wives in traditional marriages were devoted, unselfish caretakers of the
home, the family, and the marriage. As the traditional model has eroded, the
qualities associated with masculine values of achievement, self-development, and
personal fulfillment have become dominant for both spouses. With this change,
marriage has become an "exchange" relationship. Husband and wife are equal,
autonomous parties, each pursuing emotional fulfillment through marriage.
Id. at 20-21 (footnotes omitted).
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same cannot be said for the marital relationship. 284 As such, the marital
communications privilege is not supported by the second criterion.
Finally, the third criterion ofthe individual autonomy rationale requires that the
protected relationship center on choices related to a fundamental life preference. In
other words, the third criterion requires that the parties utilize the privilege to make
choices and decisions about areas of one's life that deserve constitutional
protection. 285 For example, if a penitent consults a priest for assistance in making
independent choices about constitutionally protected religious practices, then the
clergy-communicant privilege would satisfy this third criterion.
The marital communications privilege does satisfy the third criterion, but once
again, the inquiry is content-based, thereby making the privilege qualified rather
than absolute. 286 The third criterion would be satisfied where one spouse consults
the other regarding constitutionally protected choices. In the context of the familial
relationship, such constitutionally protected choices include decisions related to
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education. 2 87 Therefore, if marital communications relate to these constitutionally
protected areas, then the individual autonomy rationale suggests that the privilege
should protect disclosure of such statements. However, where the communications
relate to the commission of a crime, as is the case with many privileged
communications between spouses, none of these constitutionally protected areas is
implicated. Because the reasoning behind the individual autonomy rationale breaks
down depending on the content of the communication, this rationale would create
a qualified marital communications privilege and force courts to examine the
content of the communication before determining whether the privilege should
attach.
Additional problems exist when the individual autonomy rationale is applied
to the marital communications privilege. The proponents of this rationale argue that
an evidentiary privilege should exist only if it promotes free-flowing
communication regarding important life choices. However, as established in an
earlier portion of this Article, it is very likely that the marital privilege does little
to encourage confidential communications between spouses.288 Thus, abrogation of
the rule would probably not affect the free-flowing communication that the
individual autonomy rationale seeks to promote. In a sense, the utilitarian approach
and the individual autonomy rationale are quite similar. Each rationale posits that
an evidentiary privilege should exist only where its abrogation would affect the
flow of confidential communication. Because abrogation of the marital
communications privilege would probably not affect the flow of confidential

284. It is true that a spouse may decide to subordinate her interests to those of her spouse, but such
a decision is not inherent in the relationship. A spouse's decision to consider her interests as well as
those of her spouse would fall short of the second criterion, which requires subordination of one party's
interests for those of the other party. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 234, § 5.4.3(a), at 411.
285. Id.§ 5.4.3 at 413.
286. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
287. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citations omitted).
288. See supra Part V.A.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/3

40

Story: Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Co

2006]

MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS & E-MAIL

communications between spouses, both the utilitarian approach and individual
autonomy rationale call for abolition of the privilege.
The informational privacy rationale is the only approach that supports the
existence of the marital communications privilege, and the relationship between
informational privacy and the marital communications privilege is quite strong.
Rather than stating that the evidentiary privileges should only exist if they will
affect the flow of communication between the parties to certain protected
relationships, the informational privacy rationale recognizes that it is morally
repugnant to require the disclosure of certain private information or to force an
otherwise honest and decent person to choose among betraying his or her spouse,
lying, or going to jail.28 9 To be sure, many commentators argue that the
informational privacy rationale for the marital communications privilege is a
qualified one. It has been argued that the need for privacy in the marital relationship
should give way "where there is a need for otherwise unobtainable evidence critical
to the ascertainment of significant legal rights."29 While this rationale would not
cause courts to review the content of the confidential communication, it would
force courts to consider whether the privilege should attach to the communication
in light of one party's need for the evidence. In other contexts, lower courts
recognizing a right to informational privacy have required disclosure of the private
information where the government's interest is sufficiently compelling.29 1
Because courts have exclusively relied upon the utilitarian approach to justify
the evidentiary privileges, it is very unlikely that they would employ either of the
humanistic rationales.292 Even if courts decide to rely upon the informational
privacy rationale as a justification for the marital communications privilege, it is
very unlikely that a change in the absolute nature of the privilege would follow. As
the Supreme Court has stated, "[A]n uncertain privilege ... is little better than no
'
privilege at all."293
At the very least, the recognition of the marital communications privilege is
justified under the informational privacy rationale, and, for the time being, the
privilege will remain absolute in nature. This Article concludes with a look at
whether the use of web-based e-mail supports the informational privacy rationale
behind the marital communications privilege.

289. See Black, supra note 266, at 48.
290. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 29, § 86.
291. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.1983) (allowing public
inspection of state employees' financial disclosure statements); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570,580 (3d Cir. 1980) (allowing disclosure of employees' medical records maintained
by employer); Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978) (allowing disclosure of
government officials' private financial information); McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1381
(D.N.J. 1978) (allowing limited disclosure offirefighter applicants' psychological examination results).
292. See Goode, supra note 271, at 316 n.63 (noting that judicial reliance on theories other than
the utilitarian approach is "as rare as the proverbial hen's tooth").
293. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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VI. CONCLUSION

As stated earlier, the informational privacy rationale posits that marital
communications should be protected because it is morally distasteful to force one
spouse to betray the other.294 This rationale supports the proposition that the
confidential nature of the marital relationship should not be violated by the
government's search for evidence. The informational privacy rationale recognizes
the marital relationship as an intrinsically private one and protects private marital
communications, not to encourage greater communication between spouses, but
because it is the right thing to do.
The informational privacy rationale does not support the view that
communications sent via web-based e-mail should be protected by the marital
communications privilege. The informational privacy rationale seeks to prevent the
government from forcing one spouse to turn on the other or face a contempt charge.
If, however, a third party discloses the communication and testifies regarding its
content, then no betrayal between the spouses would result. Additionally, forcing
an ISP to disclose the content of the communication would not violate the
confidential nature of the marital relationship because the communicating spouse
chose to sacrifice the confidentiality of the communication by sending it over the
Internet and storing it on the server of a third party. The outcome would be no
different if the communicating spouse chose to send a postcard to his spouse via a
messenger and the communicating spouse had contractually agreed to allow the
messenger access to the content of the postcard. If the messenger exercised his legal
right to review the content of the postcard, there would be no violation of the
informational privacy rights of the spouses. Finally, protecting from disclosure
communication sent via web-based e-mail may not be the right thing to do. The
marital relationship is unique in that only two people are required for it to function
properly. The professional relationships will sometimes call for the necessary
involvement of third parties in order for effective communication to occur, but the
marital relationship has no such requirement. Spouses have various means of
communication that do not require the involvement of a third party who is a
stranger to the relationship. If a communicating spouse either inadvertently or
intentionally decides to involve a third party in otherwise confidential
communications with his or her spouse, then it is not morally abhorrent to require
the third party to disclose the content of the communication.
While this conclusion may be troublesome to some readers, it is no different
from concluding that one should not confidentially communicate with his or her
spouse via a bullhorn, an office intercom, a recorded prison telephone line, or an
Internet chat room. In any of these instances, Big Brother may be listening, and, if
he is, he should be allowed to disclose the content of the conversation.

294. See supraPart V.B. 1.
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